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Abstract 
How do we assess what we remember? Previous work on metacognition suggests that 
confidence judgements are more accurate when given after than before a response to a 
perceptual task. Here we present two experiments that investigate the influence of decision 
and response on metacognitive accuracy in a memory task so as to establish what kind of 
information people use to assess their memory content. Participants were asked to remember 
lists of words and then to decide which of two target words had previously been presented. In 
both experiments, participants rated their confidence either after or before the response. 
However, the experiments differed in the amount of information provided for confidence 
rating. In Experiment 1, before confidence rating, participants were either presented with 
both target words and asked to decide between them, or they were only presented with a cue 
(first letter of the subsequent target words). In Experiment 2, participants were always 
presented with a target word before confidence rating. The results of both experiments 
showed that although task accuracy correlated with confidence ratings in both conditions, this 
relationship was weaker when confidence was assessed before response to a memory task. 
We argue that metacognitive judgements are influenced by processing information that is not 
available at the time of primary response. We discuss the implications for theories of 
confidence and metacognition. 
Keywords: confidence, decision-making, memory, metacognition, metacognitive 
awareness 
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Responses improve the accuracy of confidence judgements in memory tasks. 
 
How do we assess what we perceive and remember? This question taps into the 
problem of metacognitive access to one’s own cognitive states and processes. Multiple 
theories of metacognition and consciousness claim to provide explanation for how this access 
occurs (see e.g. Baars, 1997; Cleeremans 2011, Dehaene & Naccache, 2001, Fleming & Daw, 
2016; Lau, 2008; Lau & Rosenthal, 2011), however, they are often contradictory and the 
exact mechanism is still being debated. Here, we focus on the questions concerning what 
metacognitive judgements about one’s knowledge or perceptual experience are based on (an 
issue that has been vividly discussed in decision models literature, see e.g. Moran, 
Teodorescu, & Usher, 2015) and whether their mechanisms are the same for different types 
of content (Baird, Smallwood, Gorgolewski, & Margulies, 2013; McCurdy, Maniscalco, 
Metcalfe, Liu, de Lange, & Lau, 2013). Specifically, we studied whether response in a 
memory task improves metacognition, as it has been shown in perceptual (Wierzchoń, 
Paulewicz, Asanowicz, Timmermans & Cleeremans, 2014) and problem-solving tasks 
(Siedlecka, Paulewicz, & Wierzchoń, 2016). 
Despite the differences between assumed mechanisms, there is an agreement that 
accessibility can be inferred from metacognitive reports (e.g. Baars, 1997; Dehaene & 
Naccache, 2001; Lau, 2008; Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012). 
Commonly used quantified forms of those reports are ratings on subjective scales, such as the 
Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), used to measure stimuli visibility (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 
2004) and confidence ratings (CR) that assess certainty in a stimulus-related decision 
(Tunney & Shanks, 2003). The ratings are typically collected during forced-choice tasks 
(called type 1 tasks) such as perceptual discrimination or knowledge-based classification (e.g. 
Dienes & Seth, 2010; Overgaard, Fehl, Mouridsen, Bergholt & Cleeremans, 2008; Sergent & 
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Dehaene, 2004). Using the ratings (so-called type 2 measures) one can measure 
metacognitive accuracy that is the extent to which participants are aware of information they 
used for type 1 response. Metacognitive accuracy is therefore measured as a relation between 
performance level in type 1 task and subjective ratings (Norman, Price & Jones, 2011; 
Sandberg Timmermans, Overgaard, & Cleeremans, 2010). 
The relation between information that underlies type 1 response and metacognitive 
judgement is a subject of debate (e.g. Maniscalco & Lau, 2016; Wierzchoń et al., 2014). One 
of especially interesting questions concerns the issue of whether metacognitive judgement 
reflects merely the stimulus-related signal (i.e. its strength) or is based on additional 
information. Theories of conscious access usually do not explicitly address this question, but 
the general assumption underlying signal detection-based approaches (e.g. Lau, 2008) or 
global availability theories (Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 2009) seems to 
be that type 1 responses and metacognitive judgement are based on the same information. 
This issue has been also investigated in the field of confidence models. A distinction had 
been made between models assuming single information-collection stage and the ones based 
on a premise of dual information-collection stage (for a review see e.g. Moran et al., 2015). 
Single stage models assume that confidence is calculated on the same evidence that led to 
type 1 response (Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003;  Higham, Perfect, & Bruno, 2009; 
Vickers & Lee, 1998). Proponents of dual stage models challenge this assumption and claim 
that confidence results from a separate, post-decisional stage of evidence accumulation (e.g. 
the Two-Stage Dynamic Signal Detection model, Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; the 
Collapsing Confidence Boundary model, Moran et al., 2015). The assumption of an 
additional stage is supported by the finding that the time taken to rate one’s confidence after 
type 1 decision predicts reported confidence level. This suggests that confidence is still 
processed after type 1 response had been given (Hilgenstock, Weiss, & Witte, 2014; Petrusic 
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& Baranski, 2003; Yu, Pleskac & Zeigenfuse, 2015). Also, data showing that participants 
sometimes change their minds after making perceptual decision, even though no more 
evidence is available (Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2009; Van Zandt & Maldonado-
Molina, 2004; Yu et al.,  2015), support the view that evidence accumulation continues after 
type 1 decision and therefore might be used for a subsequent confidence rating. There are also 
studies showing that choice itself can influence the level of confidence, although the 
interpretations of this effect differ (Kvam, Pleskac, Yu, & Busemeyer, 2015; Sniezek, Paese, 
& Switzer III, 1990).  
Independently of the issue whether type 1 decision and metacognitive judgement are 
based on different amount of evidence, the less frequently asked question concerns whether 
they use the same source of information. A few recent studies on perception challenge the 
idea that only stimulus-related information influences the level of confidence. For example, 
Kiani and colleagues (Kiani, Corthell, & Shalden, 2014) have shown that deliberation time of 
type 1 decision negatively correlates with certainty. The relation between confidence and 
decision time has been found before in number of memory tasks (e.g. Dougherty, Scheck, 
Nelson, & Narens, 2005; Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005; Mealor & Dienes, 2013; Petrusic & 
Baranski, 2003) and was interpreted as reflecting the quality of stimulus or memory trace 
(e.g. Ratcliff & Starns, 2009; Wixted & Mickes, 2010). However, having controlled stimulus 
strength, Kiani and colleagues (2014) found that decision time itself inversely influenced 
subjective confidence, probably as a learnt indicator of task difficulty. Other studies have 
shown that response-related motor activity and results of error monitoring could also be 
integrated into perceptual confidence. In the experiment on visual discrimination, 
participants’ certainty in the preceding decision was lowered by transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) applied to brain areas associated with motor response opposite to the 
response chosen by participant (Fleming, Maniscalco, Ko, Amendi, Ro & Lau, 2015). Boldt 
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& Yeung (2015) have shown that the magnitude of error-related electroencephalography 
activity that is present after launching an erroneous type 1 response was negatively related to 
the level of confidence in the preceding perceptual decision. 
To further investigate the issue of sources of information underlying metacognitive 
judgement, we studied whether type 1 response could alter metacognitive accuracy 
(Wierzchoń et al., 2014). In this experiment participants decided whether a backward masked 
photograph presented a male or female face. Additionally, they gave metacognitive reports 
using one of four different scales (including CR and PAS), either immediately before or after 
type 1 response. Although the accuracy of type 1 performance did not differ between 
conditions, the relation between metacognitive judgements and the accuracy of type 1 
response was stronger when the judgement followed discrimination. Therefore, post-
decisional metacognitive judgements were more accurate than the pre-decisional ones. A 
similar effect was found in an anagram-solving task in which participants assessed their 
confidence either before or after deciding whether a presented word was an anagram solution 
(Siedlecka et al., 2016). In the light of the previously mentioned experiments, we interpret 
these results as showing that metacognitive judgements are informed by additional sources of 
information provided by executing a type 1 response, such as processing time (Kiani et al., 
2014), response-related motor activity (Fleming et al., 2015) or internal accuracy feedback 
(Boldt & Yeung, 2015). 
Although the issue of information fed to the metacognitive judgement seems crucial 
for understanding the mechanisms of metacognition, there are hardly any studies). This 
lacuna is quite striking especially as in consciousness research metacognitive judgements are 
collected before, after or together with type 1 decision without taking into consideration 
possible effect of type 1 response on subjective report (Del Cul, Baillet & Dehaene, 2007; 
Del Cul et al., 2009; Jachs, Blanco, Grantham-Hill & Soto, 2015; Rounis, Maniscalco, 
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Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010; Zehetleitner & Rausch, 2013). Also, in some procedures 
used to study memory awareness (e.g. remember-know procedure; Tulving, 1985), 
metacognitive judgement preceding type 1 decision is measured after that decision has been 
overtly made (Dewhurst, Holmes, Brandt, & Dean, 2006; Mealor & Dienes, 2013). For 
example, after participants decide whether a presented item was included in the previously 
studied list, they retrospect whether the decision was based on conscious recollection of an 
item or on feeling of familiarity towards it (e.g. Dewhurst et al., 2006). Similarly, when 
retrospective and prospective judgements are measured in memory studies, the latter are  
reported after retrieval attempts (Dougherty et al., 2005; Schnyer, Verfaellie, Alexander, 
LaFleche, Nicholls, & Kaszniak, 2004).  
In order to propose a general mechanism underlying metacognitive judgements one 
needs to integrate data from studies using different types of content. There have been a few 
attempts to compare the accuracy and neural correlates of metacognitive judgements in 
perceptual and memory domains, but the results are not clear-cut. For example, although in 
some experiments metacognitive accuracy did not differ between perceptual and memory 
tasks (McCurdy et al., 2013, but see: Baird et al., 2013), it seemed to have distinct neural 
substrates in each domain (Baird et al., 2013; McCurdy et al., 2013). Following the quest for 
understanding universal mechanisms of metacognitive awareness we present a set of 
experiments aiming to test the influence of a type 1 response on metacognitive accuracy in 
tasks that involve memory. We designed experiments that were procedurally similar to the 
perceptual task used by Wierzchoń and colleagues (2014) in that participants rated their 
metacognition either before or after a two-alternative forced choice (2-AFC) type 1 task. 
We conducted two experiments to compare metacognitive accuracy between 
conditions in which confidence ratings directly followed or preceded a type 1 response. Each 
experiment contained the two conditions, but they differed in respect to type 1 task. In 
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Experiment 1, participants were asked to decide which of the two target words had been 
presented previously. In Experiment 2, participants responded whether a target word had 
been presented before. The experimental procedures allowed for varying amounts of 
decision-related information to be available to participants before they reported their 
confidence. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether confidence ratings given after a 
decision were more accurate than when given before a decision. In this experiment, 
participants either responded first to the target words (“which of the two words has been 
presented before?”) and then rated confidence in that response, or, in the second condition, 
they were asked to rate their confidence in a subsequent response before even seeing the 
target words (they were presented only with a cue: the first letter of the word to recall). This 
procedure allowed us to create conditions that differed in the presence of type 1 decisions, as 
it prevented participants in the second condition from deciding between the two target words 
prior to confidence rating. However, as a result, the two conditions differed also in respect to 
the memory process (recognition and recall) preceding the metacognitive judgement. 
Therefore, in Experiment 2 the target word was always presented at the beginning of the trial 
and conditions differed only in the presence of a type 1 (motor) response before confidence 
rating. 
We expected that metacognitive accuracy would be higher for confidence ratings 
given after a type 1 decision and after a type 1 response; this would support the view that 
carrying out a type 1 response provides additional information to that already available at the 
time of that response. This additional information processing might also be inferred from 
temporal characteristics of response and confidence rating. As metacognitive judgement is at 
least partially based on the same evidence as type 1 responses (i.e. memory trace strength), 
we expected that RT in a memory task would be negatively correlated with the level of 
confidence (Dougherty et al., 2005; Mealor & Dienes, 2013; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003; 
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Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). This relation, however, should be stronger in the case of ratings 
given after type 1 responses, as they could be informed by the amount of time used to 
respond. Additionally, we hypothesized that the time it takes to give confidence rating would 
be negatively correlated with the level of confidence (Hilgenstock et al., 2014; Petrusic & 
Baranski, 2003).  
We also investigated the relation between the timing of metacognitive judgement and 
metacognitive accuracy. There are two ways in which the duration of assessing confidence 
could relate to metacognitive accuracy. On one hand, some researchers suggest that task 
difficulty affects metacognition (Galvin et al., 2003); therefore, if rating time reflects the 
difficulty of forming a metacognitive judgement, the later the metacognitive rating, the lower 
the metacognitive accuracy should be in both conditions. Alternatively, we could expect a 
positive correlation between metacognitive accuracy and post-decisional confidence 
judgement time, which would reflect the time needed to integrate additional information from 
different sources, such as decision time or results of error monitoring (e.g. Yu et al., 2015). 
 Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to assess whether the order of type 1 decision and 
confidence rating influences metacognitive accuracy. 
 Methods 
         Participants. Thirty-eight volunteers (27 women) aged 18-30 (M = 22.47, SD = 2.63) 
took part in the experiment in return for a small payment (about 10 PLN, an equivalent of 2.5 
EUR). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written consent to 
participation in the study. The protocol for all experiments was approved by an institutional 
ethical board and was carried out in accordance with the provisions of the World Medical 
Association Declaration of Helsinki. 
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         Materials. The experiment was run on PC computers using E-Prime (version 2.0). 
The stimuli were 240 Polish six-to-eight letter words (maximum three syllables) chosen from 
a subtitle-based frequency list (Mandera, Keuleers, Wodniecka, & Brysbaert, 2014). Because 
the participants’ task was to decide which of the two words had appeared on the list 
(McCurdy et al., 2013), two alternative versions of the word lists were created. Therefore, 
each word could be an “old” or “new” word, depending on the list presented to a given 
participant. Each of the six lists contained 20 words, each starting with a different letter. The 
confidence scale was associated with either the question “How confident are you that you 
will make the right decision?”, or “How confident are you that you made the right decision?” 
The alternatives were “I am guessing”, “I am not confident”, “I am quite confident”, and “I 
am very confident” (Dienes & Perner, 2004). 
         Procedure. The experiment took place in a computer laboratory. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions that differed in respect to the task order: either 
the response to the target words (type 1) preceded the confidence rating (R-CR), or the 
confidence rating preceded the word-related response (CR-R). There were 6 experimental 
blocks, each started with a list of words presented at the centre of the screen for 20 s and was 
followed by a distracting task consisting of 6 algebra equations, to which participants 
responded by typing the outcome number. Twenty experimental trials followed, each starting 
with a cue presented in the centre of the screen for 500 ms, being the first letter of a two 
subsequently presented words. Then participants either performed the type 1 task or rated 
their confidence. During the type 1 task two words, starting with the same letter, were 
presented on the left and right side of the screen. Participants were asked to decide which 
word was presented on the previously studied list using keys “1” and “2” on the numeric 
keyboard with their right hand. In the confidence rating task, participants were asked to 
assess their confidence in choosing the right word. Participants used keys “1”, “2”, “3”, “4” 
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on the keyboard with their left hand. The time available for both, response in type 1 task and 
confidence rating was 5 s. After each trial a blank screen was presented for 1 s. At the 
beginning of the procedure participants were presented with one training list with 5 words 
and 5 subsequent recognition trials. The procedure is presented on Figure 1 (part A). 
Data analysis 
Metacognitive accuracy was operationalized as the relationship between type 1 
performance and confidence rating (Norman et al., 2011; Sandberg et al., 2010), and 
precisely as the extent to which confidence ratings predict type 1 response accuracy. This 
relation was analysed using logistic regression, which is the correct model for predicting 
binary outcomes (Norman & Price, 2015). Logistic regression has important advantages over 
popular approaches based on signal detection theory: (1) the mixed model framework allows 
us to answer several statistical questions and to control for the random effect of subjects and 
stimuli in the context of a single comprehensive analysis; (2) mixed models tolerate 
unbalanced designs and relatively small trial numbers; (3) logistic regression is not based on 
the assumption that the information available for the metacognitive judgement is a function 
only of the information available for the type 1 decision. 
The mixed logistic regression models were fitted using the lme4 package in the R 
Statistical Environment (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015; R Core Team, 2015) 
using standard (0/1) contrast coding. In Experiment 1, our main model included the following 
fixed effects: confidence rating (4 levels), order (2 levels), their interactions, as well as the 
random effects of participant-specific intercept, word, and slope. CRs were centred on the 
lowest value (“guessing”) and the basic condition was the post-decisional CR (R-CR). 
Therefore, the regression slope reflects the relation between type 1 task accuracy and 
confidence rating (metacognitive accuracy) while the intercept informs about performance 
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level when participants report guessing. Statistical significance was assessed with the Wald 
test. The data were not analysed prior to completion of the collecting stage.   
Results 
             Two participants’ data were excluded from analysis, one due to poor performance 
(34% accuracy) and one whose variance of scale usage (the number of scale points used) was 
three standard deviations below average. Next, we removed 44 omitted trials. We found no 
differences between conditions neither in the type 1 task accuracy (z = -0.94, p = .35) nor 
with respect to the response bias (z = 1.67, p = .09). The general descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table 1 and Table 2. The frequency with which participants used each scale 
point and the average accuracy for each scale point are presented on Figure 2. 
         To analyse the effect of decision-confidence rating order on metacognitive accuracy 
(that is the relation between type 1 accuracy and confidence rating) we fitted a mixed logistic 
regression model defined above. The results are presented in Table 3. The first line (intercept) 
represents type 1 response accuracy in the baseline condition (R-CR, lowest rating = 
“guessing”) on the logit scale; so the nonsignificant intercept indicates that when participants 
claimed they were guessing, their response accuracy did not differ significantly from chance 
level. The second coefficient estimates the difference between conditions (R-CR and CR-R) 
in average accuracy for the lowest scale point. This difference is statistically significant and 
shows that, when reporting guessing, participants in CR-R performed the memory task with 
higher accuracy than in R-CR. The third line estimates the statistically significant relationship 
between confidence and accuracy (in R-CR, this relationship is statistically significant). The 
last coefficient estimates the effect of condition on the confidence rating slopes. The 
relationship between confidence and accuracy was weaker in the CR-R condition than in the 
R-CR condition. Additionally, we analysed the relation between confidence and accuracy 
within CR-R, which was also statistically significant (z = 2.23, p = .02). 
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         The observed advantage of R-CR in metacognitive accuracy over CR-R could be 
attributed to the difference in the amount of time available for making metacognitive 
judgements (the time between the presentation of a letter cue and confidence rating). To 
investigate this possibility we created a new variable, CR time, which in the case of R-CR 
was equal to the sum of type 1 response RT and confidence rating RT, and in CR-R was 
equal to confidence rating RT. We did not find statistically significant relationship between 
CR time and metacognitive accuracy in either condition (R-CR:  z = -1.81, p = .07, CR-R: z = 
0.7, p = .49). 
         Lastly, to explore between-condition differences in relations between type 1 accuracy, 
confidence level and temporal characteristics of both, we performed a series of analyses using 
mixed logistic regression models (dependent variable: accuracy) and linear mixed models 
(dependent variable: confidence rating). Participants chose the correct word quicker in both 
conditions (R-CR: z = -12.29, p < .001; CR-R: z = -9.73, p < .001), and we found no 
differences in the strength of this relationship between conditions (z = 0.87, p = .38). Shorter 
type 1 response RT was associated with higher confidence in R-CR (z = -26.68, p < .001), but 
not CR-R (z = -1.79, p = .08). The difference between the conditions was statistically 
significant (z = 4.13, p < .001). Similarly, when participants rated their confidence after type 
1 response, their metacognition was more accurate when the type 1 response RT was shorter 
(R-CR: z = -4.45, p < .001). When confidence was rated before the response, we found no 
relation between RT and metacognitive accuracy (CR-R: z = -.66, p = .51). Additionally, the 
confidence RT correlated with the reported confidence level in both conditions (the longer 
confidence RT the lower confidence, R-CR: z = -11.72, p < .001, CR-R: z = -2.62, p = .01) 
although the relationship was significantly stronger in R-CR (z = 8.23, p < .001). However, 
we did not find a relation between confidence RT and metacognitive accuracy in either 
condition (R-CR: z = .55, p = .58, CR-R: z = .86, p = .39). 
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 replicated the main finding from the visual awareness 
study (Wierzchoń et al., 2014) showing that metacognitive judgements are more accurate 
when measured after type 1 response. The relation between confidence level and type 1 
accuracy was significantly stronger in R-CR condition. The effect could not be explained 
neither by the difference in difficulty between the two conditions nor by the amount of time 
available for metacognitive judgement. The comparison of average accuracy for the lowest 
scale point showed that participants in CR-R, when claiming that they would be guessing, 
actually performed better than in the R-CR condition (in which the accuracy did not differ 
significantly from chance level). The requirement of assessing one’s confidence in future 
decision probably yields to a more cautious strategy than in situation when confidence about 
past decision is assessed. Although in CR-R the “guessing” rating was not chosen more often 
that other scale points we can see that participants used middle scale points more often than 
the highest and the lowest end of the scale. On the contrary participants in R-CR used the 
highest scale points most often. 
The analysis of the relation between type 1 RT, confidence rating RT and confidence 
level replicated some previous findings but also showed further differences between 
conditions. The relation between type 1 RT and the level of confidence as well as 
metacognitive accuracy suggests that information used for type 1 decision influences also 
confidence rating (Dougherty et al., 2005; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010) as type 1 RT is 
usually interpreted as reflecting the quality of evidence (e.g. memory strength, Ratcliff & 
Starns, 2009; Wixted & Mickes, 2010). However, as expected, this relation was significantly 
stronger in R-CR condition. Therefore the response time in type 1 task could inform 
confidence rating - for example, via a heuristic that response time reflects task difficulty 
(Kiani et al., 2014). 
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The negative relation between the latency of confidence rating and the level of 
confidence has been found previously in perceptual and memory studies (e.g. Dewhurst et al., 
2006; Mealor & Dienes, 2013; Baranski & Petrusic, 1998; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003; 
Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Yu et al., 2015), and suggests that confidence is processed, at 
least partially, separately from type 1 response (e.g. Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). Conditions 
differed in terms of those relationships: it was stronger in R-CR. Those results probably stem 
from the fact that in CR-R condition CR RT and type 1 RT are partly overlapping (CR RT 
includes the time of attempting to access the word). 
Experiment 2 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to assess whether the order of type 1 response and 
confidence rating influences metacognitive accuracy. The results of Experiment 1 supports 
the hypothesis that type 1 decision can influence metacognitive accuracy. However, one 
difficulty with interpreting the results is that participants in the CR-R condition were not 
presented with the two target words before rating their confidence. This procedure was 
necessary to minimize the chance of participants making an actual decision before confidence 
rating in CR-R condition. Although in Experiment 1 we found no difference in type 1 
accuracy or bias (proportion of “left” or “right” responses) between the conditions, it is 
possible that the discrepancies in metacognitive accuracy stemmed from the difference 
between processes leading to type 1 response. For example, participants recognized a word in 
the R-CR condition but had to recall it before reporting confidence in CR-R. While post-
decisional ratings could be based on the outcome of word recognition, the pre-decisional 
metacognition could have been informed by a recall attempt following the letter cue. 
In Experiment 2 participants were always presented with a target word before being 
asked for a type 1 response or confidence rating, and therefore performed the same 
recognition task in both conditions. This procedure helped us to avoid aforementioned 
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problems, but allowed participants to make their world-related decision before rating 
confidence also in the condition in which the rating preceded the type 1 response. 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-five volunteers (8 males) aged 19-30 (M = 20.31, SD = 1.64), took 
part in the experiment in return for a small payment (about 10 PLN, an equivalent of 2.5 
EUR). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written consent to 
participation in the study. 
Materials. Materials were the same as in Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The general procedure was similar to the one used in Experiment 1. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions that differed with respect to the 
type 1 response and confidence rating order. Contrary to the previous experiment, here the 
target word was always presented before word-related response and confidence rating were 
required. Participants were presented with just one target word and then asked to answer 
whether it had been previously presented on the list. We changed this detail so that 
participants did not have to keep two words and their locations (left or right) in memory until 
the moment of response. The letter cue was replaced with a fixation point and the target word 
was presented for 500 ms. Also, the time available for responses was decreased to 3 seconds. 
The procedure is presented in Figure 1 (part B). 
Results 
None of the participants were excluded from analysis due to poor performance or low 
variance of scale usage. We removed 107 omitted trials. We did not find significant 
differences between conditions in type 1 task accuracy (z =  -1.09, p = .29), nor with respect 
to response bias (z = -0.56, p = .57). The general descriptive statistics are presented in Table 4 
and Table 5. The frequency with which participants used each scale point and the average 
accuracy for each scale point are presented on Figure 3. 
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Similarly to the model used in Experiment 1, the first line in Table 6 (intercept) 
describes the difference (on the logit scale) between accuracy and chance level in the baseline 
condition (Order R-CR, lowest rating = “guessing”). The second coefficient estimates the 
difference between conditions (R-CR and CR-R) in average accuracy for the lowest rating 
(“guessing”). We did not find such a difference between conditions. The third line estimates 
the relationship between confidence rating and accuracy (in the baseline condition, R-CR). 
This relationship is statistically significant. The last coefficient estimates the effect of 
condition on the confidence rating slopes. Confidence ratings were less strongly related to 
accuracy when given before a type 1 response (the test was two-tailed, therefore for the 
directional hypothesis that we were testing, p = .029). Additionally, we calculated the 
correlation between confidence ratings and accuracy within the CR-R condition; it was 
statistically significant (z =10.19, p < .001). 
     Since the observed advantage of R-CR over CR-R in metacognitive accuracy could be 
attributed to the difference in the amount of time available for giving a confidence rating, we 
created a variable called CR time: in condition CR-R it equalled confidence rating RT and in 
condition R-CR it equalled type 1 RT plus confidence rating RT. We found a statistically 
significant relation between CR time and metacognitive accuracy (R-CR: z = -2.83, p = .005. 
CR-R: z = -2.43, p = .02): the later the confidence rating was given, the lower the 
metacognitive accuracy was. We did not find a significant difference in the strength of this 
relationship between the two conditions (z= 0.13, p = 0.9). 
To explore the differences in the relation between type 1 response accuracy, 
confidence rating, and the temporal characteristics of both, we performed a series of analyses 
using mixed logistic regression models (dependent variable: accuracy) and linear mixed 
models (dependent variable: confidence rating). Participants chose the correct word more 
quickly in both conditions (R-CR: z = -7.04 , p < .001; CR-R: z = -5.38, p < .001) and we 
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found no differences between conditions (z = 0.4 , p = .69 ). Shorter type 1 response RT was 
associated with higher confidence in R-CR (z = -8.81, p < .001) and in CR-R (z = -10.31, p < 
.001). We did not observe a significant difference between the conditions in the strength of 
this relationship (z = -1.54, p < .13). Similarly, the quicker the type 1 response, the more 
accurate the metacognition in both conditions (R-CR: z = -3.33, p < .001, CR-R: z = -3.12, p 
= .001). We found no significant difference between the conditions (z = -0.55, p = 0.58). 
Lastly, the longer the confidence RT, the lower the confidence level in both conditions (R-
CR: z = -6.69, p < .001, CR-R: z = -6.1, p < .001, no significant difference between 
conditions: z = 0.88, p < .39). However we found no significant relationship between 
confidence RT and metacognitive accuracy in R-CR (z = -1.1, p = .27), while in the CR-R 
condition the confidence ratings that were given later were associated with lower 
metacognitive accuracy (z = -2.37, p  = .02). 
 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 replicated the main finding from Experiment 1, showing 
that metacognitive accuracy is higher when metacognitive judgement follows type 1 
response. The effect was smaller than in the previous experiment, suggesting, that in 
Experiment 1 the observed difference in metacognitive accuracy could have been enlarged by 
the differences in the amount of decision-related information available before confidence 
rating (recognition in R-CR vs. recall in CR-R condition). The results of Experiment 2 
suggest that the presence of type 1 response before metacognitive judgement increases 
metacognitive accuracy, even though a type 1 decision could have been made before 
confidence rating. Interestingly, the time of confidence judgement (measured from the 
beginning of a trial) was related to the metacognitive accuracy, but in a way that could not 
explain our main effect. Specifically, the later the confidence rating, the lower the 
metacognitive accuracy in both conditions. 
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Contrary to Experiment 1, we found no differences between conditions in type 1 
accuracy level for the lowest scale rating (“guessing”). Also, the frequency of the chosen 
scale points was similar in both conditions. This supports our interpretation of the results of 
the previous experiment. When participants were asked to rate their confidence in their future 
decision when there was limited data (they had not seen the target words yet), they engaged a 
more careful strategy compared to the condition in which they knew the target words before 
assessing the confidence of their subsequent decision. 
The analysis of the relation between type 1 response RT, confidence rating RT and 
confidence level showed further differences between the experiments. Contrary to 
Experiment 1, we found a relation between type 1 response RT and the level of confidence 
and a relation between type 1 response RT and metacognitive accuracy in both conditions. 
Therefore, presenting target words at the beginning of trials might have diminished the 
differences between conditions. After seeing the word participants might have attempted to 
make their type 1 decisions and probably got some sense of trial difficulty, experiencing 
fluency or item familiarity (Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquin, 1993; Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005). 
It has been shown that pre-judgement retrieval fluency (that is, its latency and success) 
correlates with metacognitive judgements about past and future memory performance 
(Dougherty et al., 2005; Matey, Dunlosky, & Guttentag, 2001; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993). 
Similarly to Experiment 1, confidence rating RT was negatively related to the 
confidence level in both conditions, which again supports the hypothesis that confidence is 
processed, at least partially, separately from type 1 responses (e.g. Pleskac & Busemeyer, 
2010; Yu et al., 2015). Also, similarly to the Experiment 1, we did not observe a significant 
relationship between confidence rating RTs and metacognitive accuracy in the R-CR 
condition, although we found a negative relationship in CR-R. Therefore we are not able to 
determine whether the time taken to judge post-decisional confidence is associated with the 
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difficulty of processing confidence (decreased metacognitive accuracy for longer confidence 
RTs) or with integrating additional information (increased metacognitive accuracy for longer 
confidence RTs). This is interesting in the context of studies showing that increasing the time 
between decision and confidence rating improves confidence resolution (the degree to which 
confidence judgements discriminate between correct and incorrect choices, Yu et al., 2015). 
In the study of Yu and colleagues (2015), participants were prompted to rate their confidence 
at given moments; when the post-decisional time increased, the confidence in incorrect 
decisions decreased. It seems that when a state of confidence in each time interval is 
measured it might reflect additional information integrated from the error-monitoring system. 
On the other hand, when participants are free to choose the moment of rating (within a time 
limit, as in our experiments), the process becomes more noisy and contaminated with other 
processes (e.g. an evidence searching strategy), therefore it becomes difficult to determine its 
relation to the accuracy.  
General discussion 
The main finding of the presented experiments is that metacognitive assessments are 
more accurate when given after rather than before type 1 decision. Metacognitive accuracy 
does not improve with time therefore the effect could not be explained away only by the 
difference in interval between letter cue and confidence rating. The data also showed that the 
level of confidence correlates not only with type 1 response time but also with the time of the 
rating itself. The findings are consistent across the two experiments, even though the 
procedures differed in a several ways. In Experiment 1 participants performed different type 1 
tasks in each condition (recognition in R-CR and recall in CR-R) while in Experiment 2 the 
same recognition task was used in both conditions. Also, in Experiment 1 participants saw a 
target and could make their type 1 decision before confidence judgement only in the R-CR 
condition; in Experiment 2 the target was always presented before type 1 response and 
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confidence rating, therefore conditions differed only in the order of these two responses. 
Together with data on the relation between the level of confidence and temporal 
characteristics of type 1 response and confidence rating, our results suggest that 
metacognitive judgements are based on information integrated from multiple sources; this 
could include external cues, i.e. those available in the task itself, or internal cues such as 
memory trace strength, decision and response given by a participant. The outcome of the 
experiments also support the view that processes underlying subjective ratings are universal, 
as the influence of response on metacognitive accuracy was also found in a perceptual study 
(Wierzchoń at al, 2014) and problem-solving task (Siedlecka et al., 2016). 
The results interpreted in the context of confidence models support the hypothesis that 
metacognitive reports are based on different amount of information than available at the time 
of type 1 response (Graziano, Parra, & Sigman, 2015; Hilgenstock et al., 2014; Petrusic & 
Baranski, 2003; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010). Although those models apply to post-
decisional confidence, the results showing the difference between post and pre-decisional and 
post and pre-response confidence ratings stand against single information-collection stage 
theories (Vickers & Lee, 1998; Higham et al., 2009). Assuming that confidence is set at the 
time of a type 1 decision, one could expect larger latency of confidence rating in the CR-R 
condition because of the inclusion of both the attempt to recall/recognize the word and the 
confidence processing time; however, the correlation between confidence and type 1 accuracy 
should be equally strong in both conditions. This was not the case in our study. Moreover, we 
found negative correlations between confidence rating RT and the level of confidence, 
usually interpreted as indicating a separate stage of evidence accumulation (Hilgenstock et 
al., 2014; Petrusic & Baranski, 2003). 
The data from our experiments also suggest that metacognitive judgements are based 
on information integrated from different sources. Although, our study was not designed to 
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directly identify those sources, the data indicates that they include type 1 decision and 
response characteristics. The analysis of reaction times has shown that delayed type 1 
responses were associated with a lower level of metacognitive awareness (in Experiment 1 
only for post-decisional confidence rating). Since response time is thought to be an index of 
task difficulty (e.g. Wixted & Mickes, 2010), this result is in line with data showing that the 
ease or success of the word retrieval attempt (Dougherty et al., 2005; Kelley & Lindsay, 
1993; Koriat & Ma’ayan, 2005) and the duration of actual decision (Kiani et al., 2014) 
informs metacognitive judgement. Similarly, the aforementioned studies on response-related 
activity of the premotor cortex (Fleming et al., 2015), results of response-related error 
monitoring (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Scheffers & Coles, 2000) and interceptive feedback 
(Wessel, Danielmeier, & Ullsperger, 2011) point to the interpretation that response-related 
characteristics are a crucial source of information for metacognitive assessment. Interestingly, 
Fleming and Daw (2017) have recently proposed a second-order model of metacognition in 
which one’s own actions contribute to confidence reports (Fleming & Daw, 2017). The 
predictions of the model were compared to data from our experiment on an anagram task 
(Siedlecka et al., 2016) which displayed similar patterns. 
Considering alternative explanations for the influence of type 1 decision and response 
on metacognitive accuracy we should mention studies showing the effect of choice on 
confidence calibration (understood as the probability of being correct that people assign to 
their answers, relative to the actual proportion correct, Kvam et al., 2015; Sniezek et al., 
1990). For example, the quantum confidence model assumes that when a decision is made the 
indefinite state of evidence changes into a definite choice state, reducing a person's 
uncertainty (Kvam, et al., 2015). The support for this model comes from experiments 
showing that participants are less overconfident in the condition in which type 1 response 
precedes confidence rating compared to the condition in which participants simultaneously 
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reported both type 1 decision and confidence (Kvam et al., 2015). On the other hand, Śniezek 
and colleagues (1990) suggested that explicit choice reduces overconfidence due to more 
cognitive processing related to decision-making. The data from our experiments are not in 
line with the results from the aforementioned studies: in Experiment 1 we actually observed 
underconfidence (above-chance performance level for “guessing”) in the condition in which 
type 1 decision followed confidence. This difference between the results might be yet another 
example of the importance of the sequential relation between type 1 decision, response and 
confidence judgement. For example, when participants are asked to report decision and 
confidence on the same scale (i.e. “certain that A - certain that B”, Kvam et al. 2015), 
although confidence does not follow type 1 response, it is probably processed differently to a 
situation in which no decision was made prior to or simultaneously with confidence rating.  
In future studies we should try to separate the decision itself and its motor execution 
in a single experiment. Although studies on perceptual confidence point to the role of neural 
activity related to motor response (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Fleming et al., 2015), we cannot 
exclude the possibility that covert decisions also affect metacognitive accuracy. However, it 
is hard to address this issue experimentally. When participants are asked to make a decision 
without a response then to measure the relation between type 1 accuracy and metacognitive 
judgement we have to trust them to remember and report the same decision afterwards (after 
metacognitive judgement), even if they change their minds in the meantime. At the same 
time, it is difficult to design a condition in which participants carry out motor response to a 
task without making a decision first. One way to achieve this is to induce a task irrelevant 
motor reaction that might overlap with stimuli-related responses (Siedlecka, Hobot, Skóra, 
Paulewicz, Timmermans, & Wierzchoń, in preparation). 
To conclude, our results indicate that response in a memory task improves 
metacognitive assessment of related memory content. However, further research is needed to 
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determine the mechanisms of metacognitive assessments and the factors influencing its 
accuracy. Also, the observed discrepancy between metacognitive accuracy for confidence 
rating given after and before type 1 response adds to the empirical hurdles that confidence 
models should overcome (Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2011; Moran et al., 2015). Apart from the 
theoretical implications, there are also some practical outcomes. We suggest that subjective 
reports proceeding and following type 1 responses should not be used interchangeably.   
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Table 1 
Average type 1 response accuracy, type 1 response RT (ms), confidence rating RT(ms) and 
the average level of confidence in both conditions in Experiment 1  
Condition Accuracy RT 
type 1  
response 
M (SD) 
RT 
correct 
type 1 
response 
M (SD) 
RT 
incorrect 
type 1 
response 
M (SD) 
RT 
confidence 
ratings 
M (SD) 
Confidence 
for correct  
type 1 
response 
M (SD) 
Confidence 
for incorrect  
type 1 
response 
M (SD) 
R-CR 86% 1955 (773) 1872 (721) 2443 (886) 733 (508) 2.42 (0.84) 1.48 (0.97) 
CR-R 84% 1749 (716) 1678 (668) 2112 (837) 1367 (932) 1.62 (0.92) 1.47 (0.91) 
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Table 2 
Average confidence rating RT (ms) and the frequency for each scale point in each condition 
in Experiment 1 
 Guessing Not confident Quite confident Very confident 
R-CR 
RT 
M (SD) 
766 (574) 991 (671) 864 (511) 605 (398) 
Frequency 6% 14% 25% 55% 
CR-R 
RT 
M (SD) 
1559 (1004) 1459 (1038) 1289 (829) 1147 (826) 
Frequency 12% 36% 34% 18% 
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Table 3 
Regression coefficients for the logistic regression mixed model for accuracy in Experiment 1 
Number of participants: 36 
Number of observations: 4281 
Estimate SE z p (two-tailed) 
Intercept -0.23 .15 -1.52 .13 
Order CR-R 1.58 .22 7.06 < .001*** 
Confidence rating 1.10 .09 11.92 < .001*** 
Confidence rating: Order CR-R -0.86 .14 -6.17 < .001*** 
likelihood ratio: χ2(4) = 288, p < .001         
  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001         
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Table 4 
Average type 1 response accuracy, type 1 response RT (ms), confidence RT (ms) and the 
average level of confidence in both conditions in Experiment 2 
 Condition Accuracy RT 
type 1 
response 
M (SD) 
RT 
correct  
type 1 
response 
M (SD) 
RT 
incorrect  
type 1 
response 
M (SD) 
RT 
confidence 
rating 
M (SD) 
Confidence 
for correct 
type 1 
response 
M (SD) 
Confidence 
for incorrect 
type 1 
response 
M (SD) 
R-CR 79% 862 (495) 816 (472) 1033 (539) 738 (481) 3.26 (0.88) 2.62 (0.92) 
CR-R 77% 536 (330) 519 (308) 595 (389) 1173 (606) 3.25 (0.92) 2.72 (0.95) 
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Table 5 
Average confidence rating RT (ms) and the frequency for each scale point in each condition 
in Experiment 2 
 Guessing Not confident Quite confident Very confident 
R-CR 
RT 
M (SD) 
971.19 (566) 889.84 (519) 829.74 (493) 575.76 (388) 
Frequency 6% 20% 30% 44% 
CR-R 
RT 
M (SD) 
1375.66 (669) 1425.46 (604) 1334.45 (590) 945.70 (521) 
Frequency 6% 21% 26% 47% 
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Table 6 
Regression coefficients for the logistic regression mixed model for accuracy in Experiment 2 
Number of participants: 55 
Number of observations: 6493 
Estimate SE z p (two-tailed) 
Intercept -0.10 0.12 -0.88 .38 
Order CR-R 0.18 0.14 1.30 .20 
Confidence rating 0.79 0.07 11.76 <.001*** 
Confidence rating: Order CR-R -0.17 0.09 -1.90 .03 (one tailed)* 
likelihood ratio: χ2(5) = 430, p < .001         
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001         
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Figure 1. Procedure of the task in Experiment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B). Conditions: R-
CR: response followed by confidence rating, CR-R: confidence rating followed by response. 
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Figure 2. Average accuracy of type 1 responses, scale response frequency and model fit for the 
relationship between response accuracy and confidence ratings in each condition in Experiment 1 (R-
CR, response-confidence rating; CR-R, confidence rating-response). The position of filled circles 
represents average accuracy for each scale point. The frequency describes the proportion of each 
confidence rating response in each condition.  
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Figure 3. Average accuracy of type 1 responses, scale response frequency and model fit for the 
relationship between accuracy and confidence ratings in each condition in Experiment 2 (R-CR, 
response-confidence rating; CR-R, confidence ratind-response). The position of filled circles 
represents average accuracy for each scale point. The frequency describes the proportion of each 
confidence rating response in each condition. 
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